Point of Departure and Motivation
Suppose we observe a finite number of choices of a consumer from competitive budget sets. If these choices satisfy a condition called "cyclic consistency" by Afriat (1967) , then (and only then) there exists a continuous, monotonic, and concave utility function which is maximised by these choices, taking the corresponding budget as a constraint. Furthermore, Afriat was able to construct such a utility function using the so called Afriat numbers. Varian (1982 Varian ( , 1983 ) introduced a condition-the "Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference" (Garp)-which is equivalent to cyclic consistency and particularly easy to test. This result, now commonly known as Afriat's Theorem, is remarkable for many reasons. It assumes competitive budget sets which occur quite naturally in a competitive economy; real data is therefore very likely to be generated by choices on such budgets. This, and the ease with which Garp can be tested, highlights the operational aspects of revealed preference theory. Afriat's Theorem, as shown by Varian (1982) , also states that if the choices could have been generated by a continuous and non-satiated utility function, then they could have also been generated by a monotonic and concave utility function. But is this a "good" or "bad" aspect of revealed preference theory when choices are made on competitive budgets? It can be considered to be bad in the sense that it shows the limitations of dealing with data consisting of choices from competitive budgets: Choices generated by a non-satiated utility function are empirically indistinguishable from (or observationally equivalent to) choices generated by a monotonic and concave utility function. In terms of Chambers et al. (2010) , the theory of non-satiated utility maximisation is the falsifiable closure of the theory of monotonic concave utility maximisation.
Putting the falsifiability aspect aside, the data we observe can be put to very good use. Varian (1982) shows how to construct sets of revealed preferred and revealed worse bundles, based on consistency with Garp, which are boundaries on a consumer's indifference set. Thus, based on the assumption that a consumer's preference is indeed monotonic and convex he shows how to recover everything that can be set about a consumer's preference without recovering anything that cannot be said. In particular, his analysis is completely nonparametric and does not rely on parameter estimates of a particular functional form of a utility function which represents a consumer's preference. His definition of revealed preferred and worse sets relies on Garp for competitive budget sets. This makes it difficult to apply these sets to the framework of, for example, Yatchew (1985) or Forges and Minelli (2009) (see below) . The results in this paper make the recovery of such sets straightforward.
Given that competitive budgets are a natural starting point in economics, extensive examinations of revealed preference and the nonparametric analysis based on it are well motivated. In the last years, revealed preference analysis has received a lot of attention by experimental economists (see, for example, Sippel 1997 , Mattei 2000 , Harbaugh and Krause 2000 , Harbaugh et al. 2001 , Andreoni and Miller 2002 , Février and Visser 2004 , Chen et al. 2006 , Fisman et al. 2007 , Choi et al. 2007a , Banerjee and Murphy 2007 , Dickinson 2009 , Dawes et al. 2011 . Economic experiments, if appropriately incentivised, are an almost ideal setting to test if subjects' preferences satisfy certain assumptions, as it allows to collect the kind of data we need without many caveats.
Most of these experiments rely on experimentally induced competitive budget sets. This may be partly because such budgets are easy to describe to subjects, and partly because the revealed preference literature mainly provides nonparametric techniques for such budgets. However, the graphical representation of budgets to subjects and the possibility for subjects to select the desired bundle with a computer mouse introduced in Fisman et al. (2007) and Choi et al. (2007a) (see also Choi et al. 2007b) should make it quite possible to provide subjects with more general budget sets. The analysis in this paper provides some of the tools needed to analyse such data.
Why would it be interesting to present subjects more general budget sets? First, it would allow to test if preferences really are monotonic and convex. For example, several experiments have examined subjects' social preferences; but social preferences can contain spite or inequality aversion, and social preferences may therefore not be monotonic. Second, suppose a subject has Leontief-type preferences. Varian's (1982) analysis shows that recovering large parts of the "revealed worse" set of this subject would require very steep budget sets. Very steep budget sets, however, would result in very expensive experiments if there are also many subjects with perfect substitute preferences. More general budget sets would allow to recover large parts of a subject's preference without having to worry about excessive costs. Afriat's (1967) work emphasised the operational aspects of revealed preference theory based on competitive budgets. Varian (1982 Varian ( , 1983 showed how to use such revealed preference relations for nonparametric analysis and how to test several assumptions of the particular forms of utility. Yatchew (1985) extended the approach for budget sets which are finite unions of convex sets. Matzkin and Richter (1991) showed how to test revealed preference data for the existence of a rationalising strictly concave of utility function. Matzkin (1991) and Forges and Minelli (2009) provided revealed preference axioms and an Afriat's Theorem for more general budget sets. Heufer (2010) provided an analysis of choices on probability simplices, Kalandrakis (2010) provided an analysis of binary choices of voters. These two papers dispense with the monotonicity assumption and analyse the data for consistency with a certain point of satiation. Demuynck (2009) analysed closure operators on partial (incomplete) relations and provided conditions for the existence of complete extensions which satisfy certain assumptions.
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Outline
Section 2 introduces the basic notation and the concepts used in the paper. In particular, it defined several specific binary relations, introduced the basic assumptions on budgets, decision makers, and observables, defined closure operators, and defines the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preferences (Garp) as the main point of departure. Section 3 defines our concept of rationalising extensions and shows that Garp guarantees the existence of a complete, continuous, and rationalising extension of the revealed preference relation. The section further discusses the problems of verifying non-satiation of preferences and shows how to test for single-peakedness of preferences. It then goes on to provide several new axioms which are necessary and sufficient for the existence of convex, monotonic, or single-peaked rationalising extensions and for some combinations of the characteristics. Section 4 shows how large parts of a preference underlying observed choices can be recovered when imposing additional assumptions, and it discusses computational aspects of the framework. Section 5 discusses several other assumptions which can be imposed on revealed preference relations. Section 6 concludes.
preliminaries 2.1 General Definitions
We use the following notation: N = {1, 2, . . .} is the set of natural numbers excluding 0.
, then X is also compact. Let 2 X be the power set of X. Let
the Euclidean distance function. For any set S ⊆ X, the interior of S, denoted intS, is the set of all points x ∈ S for which there exists an ε > 0 such that N ε (x) ⊂ S. The closure of S, denoted clS, is the set of all x ∈ X such that for all ε > 0, N ε (x) ∩ S ≠ ∅. The boundary of a set S is ∂S = clS/intS.
The convex hull of a set Y ⊂ X is the smallest convex set in X that contains Y; more precisely, it is the intersection of all convex sets in X containing Y. For a finite set {s 1 , . . . , s n } = S ⊂ X, the convex hull is simply
The monotonic hull is
6 and the convex monotonic hull is
An affine subspace of R L is a translate of a linear subspace, that is, 
A convex polytope is the convex hull of all its extreme points (Brøndsted 1983, Theorem 5.10) . A set F ⊂ S is a proper face (or simply face) of S if there exists a supporting hyperplane H of S such that F = S ∩ H, F ≠ ∅, and F ≠ S. The dimension of a face F is the dimension of the affine hull of F. A face F is called a k−face if the dimension of F is k. A 0−face is called a vertex, and a 1−face is called an edge. A (k − 1)−face is also called a facet. Then an equivalent definition of an extreme point is to say that y ∈ S is an extreme point if {y} is a vertex.
For two sets S 1 , S 2 ∈ R L , the Minkowski sum is the set obtained by adding all elements of S 2 to all elements of S 1 , that is,
For λ ∈ [0, 1], the weighted Minkowski average is defined as
Note that if S 1 and S 2 are convex, the Minkowski sum and the weighted Minkowski average of the two sets are convex as well. Further note that if S 1 ⊂ S 2 , then (1 − λ)S 1 + λ S 2 ⊂ S 2 for λ ∈ [0, 1).
Binary Relations
A binary relation Q on X is a set of ordered pairs of elements of X. Let Q be the set of all binary relations on X. A binary relation Q is
• complete if for all x, y ∈ X, either (x, y) ∈ Q or (y, x) ∈ Q;
• continuous if for all x ∈ X the sets {y ∈ X ∶ (x, y) ∈ Q} and {y ∈ X ∶ (y, x) ∈ Q} are closed;
• non-satiated if for all x ∈ X and all ε > 0, there exists a y ∈ N ε (x) such that (y, x) ∈ Q and (x, y) ∉ Q;
• single-peaked at ϕ if there exists one and only one ϕ ∈ X such that (ϕ, x) ∈ Q and (x, ϕ) ∉ Q for all x ≠ ϕ;
denote the symmetric part of Q, and A(Q) = Q/S(Q) the asymmetric part of Q. For binary relations which involve symbols like ≿ and ≻, we will also write ≿ −1 = ≾ and
Budget Sets and Decision Makers
A budget set or simply budget is a subset of X. The only restriction we place on a budget set B ⊂ X is that is compact, that its interior is non-empty, and that for all x ∈ B there exists a ε > 0 such that the interior of N ε (x) ∩ B is non-empty 1 . Let B be the family of all such budgets.
A particular kind of budgets are the budgets faced by a competitive consumer in demand theory. These budgets are defined by a price vectorp ∈ R L ++ and wealthw ∈ R ++ , such that B(p,w) = {x ∈ X ∶p ⋅ x ≤w}, where ⋅ denotes the dot product. Assuming homogeneity of demand, we can normalise price vectors and wealth such that p =p/w and w = 1; we will therefore always use competitive budgets of the form B(p, 1) = B(p) = {x ∈ X ∶ p ⋅ x ≤ 1}. Let B D denote the family of all such budgets.
We assume that a decision maker (dm) can be represented by a transitive, complete, and continuous binary relation on X. This binary relation ≿ ∈ Q represents his preference according to which he decides which element or elements to choose from a budget. The interpretation is as usual, i.e. (x, y) ∈ ≿ means that to the dm x is at least as good as y. The asymmetric part ≻ = A(≿ * ), is interpreted as a strict preference, that is, (x, y) ∈ ≻ means that to the dm x is strictly better than y. We will focus on particular subsets of preferences. The basic assumptions on preferences are expressed in the definitions of the following sets:
≿ T = {Q ∈ Q ∶ Q is transitive, complete, and continuous},
The assumption that the dm is rational states that when asked to choose a element from a budget set B, he will choose an x such that (x, y) ∈ ≿ for all y ∈ B.
From Data to Revealed Preference
The primitives of our model, the observations on a dm, are a finite number of budget sets faced by the dm and the choices he makes from these sets. An observation consists of a budget B ⊂ X and a choice (or demand) D(B) ∈ X consisting of a single element, where
where {s i } i∈I is shorthand notation for ⋃i∈I{s i }. In a slight abuse of notation, we also allow M = 0, meaning that we have no observations on that dm. We denote Ω 1 = {x i } i∈M and Ω 2 = {B i } i∈M .
The basic idea of revealed preference is that the choice of a dm reveals something about his preference. Because he is observed to choose x i ∈ B i instead of some other x ∈ B i , x ≠ x i , we conclude that he prefers
Note that when we use the term "prefers" we mean that to the dm, x i is at least as good as any other available alternative; in particular, x i is preferred to itself. When we mean that to the dm, x i is better (and not just at least as good) than some other x, we will say that he strictly prefers x i to x.
We use the observations to draw the conclusion that the dm prefers
we define the revealed preference relation ≿ * as
We could also draw the conclusion that the dm strictly prefers x i ∈ B i over all x ∈ intB i . This conclusion makes immediate sense if preferences are assumed to be non-satiated. If, however, there is a point of satiation ϕ ∈ X, and ϕ ∈ intB, then D(B) = ϕ and ϕ would be strictly preferred to itself; but for now, we define the strict revealed preference relation ≻ * as
The basic idea is then simply that ≿ * ⊂ ≿ and ≻ * ⊂ ≻, that is, that ≿ is an extension of ≿ * (see Section 2.6). Note that (x, y) ∈ ≿ * if and only if x = D(B i ) and y ∈ B i for some i ∈ M , and (x, y) ∈ ≻ * if and only if
Alternatively, it is often assumed that one observes multi-valued choices, i.e. a subset
with possibly more than one element. Then ≻ * can be defined as
Such multi-valued choices may be observable under ideal conditions; however, it is more realistic that one observes a single element as the choice from a budget. Let
is the set of all observed choices which are directly or indirectly revealed preferred to x.
Closure Operators
A closure operator on a binary relation Q ∈ Q is a function C ∶ Q → Q which is extensive, increasing, and idempotent: Q is
increasing if
We will apply closure operators to revealed preference relations to "impose" certain additional assumptions.
When we apply two or more closure operators to a binary relation Q, we denote this as
The revealed preference relation does not account for the fact that every element of X is as good as itself. We therefore need a very basic operator, the reflexive closure:
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The second very important operator we need is the transitive closure. Let CT (0) (Q) = C R (Q) and for i ∈ N,
then define the transitive closure as
We will call C T (≿ * ) the indirect revealed preference relation. The monotonic closure is defined as
For the convex closure, we first define for some set S ⊂ X,
and then
≠ {x}}, and let |Ξ| denote the cardinality of Ξ. For i ∈ N, let 2 Ξ i be the set of all subsets of Ξ with exactly i distinct elements. Let CC (0) (Q) = C T (Q) and for i ∈ N,
then define
then define the convex closure as
The definition of the convex closure may require some explanation. For ease of illustration, suppose Q is an incomplete preference relation, and assume it is a subset of a complete, continuous, and convex preference R. The set Υ * ({x}, Q, y) is simply the line segment connecting x and y, excluding the point x. If (y, x)
were an element of R, then by convexity Υ * ({x}, Q, y) would have to be a subset of the preferred set of y, R, x) , and if CE({x}, Q, y) = 1, the worse set of x would intersect the preferred set of y. Thus either (y, x) ∉ R or {(x, y), (y, x)} ∈ R; in any case, by completeness of R, we need (x, y) ∈ R.
Consider now a set S = {x,
If (y, x) ∈ R, then by transitivity (y, x ′ ) ∈ R and therefore by convexity CH({x,
is obviously a contradiction. Case (ii) implies (z, y) ∈ R and thus (x ′ , y) ∈ R, and with (x, x ′ ) ∈ R, we have (x, y) ∈ R. Case (iii) implies with (x, z) ∈ R that (x, y) ∈ R. So suppose instead that (x ′ , x) ∈ R. If we had (y, x) ∈ R, then by convexity Υ(S, Q, y) ⊆ U(R, x). Then we can repeat the previous steps for some z ∈ L(Q, x) to obtain that (x, y) ∈ R. When considering a set S with at least three elements (in two dimensions), the construction of Υ * becomes relevant. Suppose that we want to check if {(y, x), (y, x ′ ), (y, x ′′ )} ∈ R is possible, with S = {x, x ′ , x ′′ } and L = 2. Suppose we first try this based on the assumption that
does not already contradict this possibility). Then Υ(S, Q, y) would be a subset of the preferred set of x.
What the construction of Υ * now does is (in the two dimensional case) to remove the edges (which in this case are facets) of the convex polygon Υ(S, Q, y) which do not contain the vertex {y}.
2 If the worse set
, it is tangent to one of the two edges which are removed in Υ * ), this is not a contradiction, as there still is the possibility that x, x ′ , and x ′′ are all indifferent according to R and y is preferred to all of them. Only if L(Q, x) intersects either (i) the interior of Υ(S, Q, y) or (ii) a facet which contains y do we have a contradiction. In case (i), this follows from continuity, and in case (ii) this follows from the same arguments as in the preceding paragraph. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
(e) Case (ii). 
Note that in case (i), there is already a violation of convexity even if y is not considered.
When dealing with a finite number of observations, the definitions of the transitive and convex closure are perfectly operational, that is, we can compute these closures in a finite number of steps, as the first proposition shows.
Proposition 1 For all
is impossible as it would require an observation with index in M /{i, j, k, . . . , ℓ} = ∅, and if
is the convex hull of a (possibly empty) subset of Ω 1 .
The following facts are mostly straightforward. 
Fact 1 1. C R is a closure operator. 2. C T is a closure operator and C T (Q) ∈ ≿ T . 3. C M is a closure operator and C
M (Q) ∈ ≿ M . 4. C C is a closure operator and C C (Q) ∈ ≿ C .
C S(ϕ) is a closure operator and C S(ϕ) ∈ ≿ S(ϕ) . 6. C C,M is a closure operator and C
C,M (Q) ∈ (≿ C ∩ ≿ M ).
C C,S(ϕ) is a closure operator and C C,S(ϕ) (Q) ∈ (≿ C ∩ ≿ S(ϕ)
Again it is straightforward that C C is extensive and increasing. For idempotence, let
. 5. This is obvious. 6. This follows from 3 and 4.
7. This follows from 4 and 5. Suzumura (1976) shows that a binary relation has an extension if and only if it is consistent. Demuynck (2009) proves a more general result: If a closure operator C satisfies certain restrictions, then Q has a complete extension
Complete Extensions of Binary Relations
This is quite a remarkable result, as it allows to test certain hypothesis on the preferences of a dm. In particular, let Ext(Q, C) = {Q ∈ Q ∶ C(Q) e → Q} be the set of all binary relations on X such that the closure operator C extends Q, and consider the following conditions:
Cond 2: For every Q ∈ Ext(Q, C) such that N(Q) ≠ ∅ (i.e., Q is not complete), there exists a non-empty
Then Demuynck (2009) 
The World According to Garp
In the context of demand theory with consumption choices from competitive budgets, Varian (1982) introduces a condition called the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference (Garp), which is equivalent to Afriat's (1967) cyclic consistency condition. We will use Garp as the primary point of departure in our analysis.
Axiom 1 A set of observations Ω with associated revealed preference relations (≿
* , ≻ * ) satisfies the Gener- alised Axiom of Revealed Preference (Garp) if Ψ[C C (≿ * ), x i ] ∩ intB i = ∅ for all i ∈ M.
Remark 1 Equivalently, Ω satisfies Garp if whenever
The definition above was chosen because it highlights the similarities with axioms defined below.
. Similarly, (x, y) ∈ ≺ * if and only if y = x i and x ∈ intB i for some 
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Fact 2 is trivial.
Fact 3
The following conditions are equivalent:
and (x, y) ∈ ≻ * , which violates Garp.
(iii) ⇔ (iv) This is obvious (see also Fact 2).
From Fact 3 and Theorem 1 is follows that Garp is equivalent to the existence of a complete and transitive binary relation Q on X which extends C T (≿ * ) and obeys the strict revealed preference relation ≻ * as defined above.
3 continuous extension results
Continuous Extensions of Binary Relations
When preferences are defined on topological spaces it is interesting to consider continuous extensions. In the context of this paper, we have assumed that X ⊆ R L + , hence X is a separable topological space. As we have assumed that the dm is representable by a continuous, complete, and transitive preference, we need to ask under what circumstances C T (≿ * ) has a continuous extension that obeys ≻ * .
A utility function u ∶ X → R rationalises a set of observations Ω if u(x) ≥ u(y) whenever (x, y) ∈ ≿ * and u(x) > u(y) whenever (x, y) ∈ ≻ * . Similarly, a binary relation Q ∈ ≿ T rationalises a set of observations
By Theorem 1 and Fact 2, a complete and transitive
always exists, so A(Q) ⊃ ≻ * is the part that has potential empirical meaning.
We omit the proof, as it follows directly from the definition of A[C T (≿ * )]. Fact 4 simply states that the set of all elements to which x is directly or indirectly revealed preferred is (i) empty if x was not observed as a choice, (ii) is the union of all the budgets associated with choices to which x is preferred without x itself and without the choices which are preferred to x.
Lemma 1 Suppose Ω satisfies Garp. Then for all x ∈ X, there exists an open set S ⊂ X such that for all s ∈ S,
], x) = ∅, which is why we only need to consider x ∈ Ω 1 .
Garp implies that if
, then x j ∈ ∂B i for all i, j ∈ M ; this also means that
. Let E be the set of all ε > 0 for which this condition holds.
] is a closed set. See Figure 2 for an illustration. Set S
Thus, S i satisfies the requirements. 
An irreflexive and transitive binary relation Q on (a topological space) X is lower-semicontinuous if L(Q, x) is open for all x ∈ X.
4 It is separable if there exists a countable subset S of X such that, whenever (x, y) ∈ Q, there exists an s ∈ S such that {(x, s), (s, y)} ⊂ Q. It is spacious if whenever (x, y) ∈ Q, then clL(Q, y) ⊂ L(Q, x). These definitions are needed for the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Peleg 1970 
Obviously, such a continuous utility function can be used to define a complete, transitive, and continuous binary relation. Furthermore, if we have such a binary relation, Debreu (1954) has shown that there exists an order preserving utility function, as summarised in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Debreu 1954) Suppose Q ∈ ≿ T . Then there exists a continuous utility function u ∶ X → R such that (x, y) ∈ Q implies u(x) > u(y).
Putting these results together, we obtain the following fact.
Fact 5 For Q ∈ Q , there exists a continuous function u ∶ X → R such that (x, y) ∈ Q implies u(x) > u(y) if and only if there exists an R ∈ ≿ T such that Q ⊆ A(R).
Proof The existence of u follows from the fact that R is continuous and Theorem 3. If there exists a continuous u, then R = {(x, y) ∈ X × X ∶ u(x) ≥ u(y)} ∈ ≿ T satisfies the requirements.
We define the following set of rationalising extensions:
We can now show that Garp is equivalent to the existence of a complete extension which rationalises Ω, and by Fact 5 the equivalence to the existence of a rationalising utility function follows.
Theorem 4 R T ≠ ∅ if and only if Ω satisfies Garp.
Proof To show necessity of Garp, suppose Garp is violated with (x j , x i ) ∈ ≻ * and (
and assume that Q extends
, and therefore
To show sufficiency of Garp, suppose Ω satisfies Garp. Let P(x i ) be the set constructed in Lemma
and for all y ∈ P(x i ), (y,
. Define a binary relation ≻ + on X as
By construction, ≻ + is a binary relation on X which satisfies the condition in Theorem 2. Thus, by Theorem 2, there exists a continuous utility function u such that (x, y) ∈ ≻ + implies u(x) > u(y).
If (x, y) ∈ S[C T (≿ * )], then P(x) = P(y) and (x, y) ∉≻ + . Then we must also have u(x) = u(y):
≠ ∅, and with P(x) = P(y), it follows that {z ∈ X ∶ u(z) > u(y)} ∩ P(y) ≠ ∅. But then there is a z ∈ P(y), therefore (y, z) ∈ ≻ + , and u(z) > u(y), a contradiction.
, then y ∈ P(x), and therefore (x, y) ∈≻ + , which implies u(x) > u(y).
, and (by Fact 3) ≻ * ⊂ ≻ + , the result follows.
The Problem with Single-Peakedness and Non-Satiation
With general budget sets, it is not easy to test if there exist non-satiated or single-peaked continuous extensions of a revealed preference relation. This is illustrated in Figure 3 , which shows eight budgets and choices. Suppose there is a preference ≿ which is maximised by the choices, and suppose there is a single point of satiation enclosed by the four budgets to the lower left. Even though all budget sets are convex (and therefore contractible) and the set of observations satisfies Garp, there does not exist a transitive, complete, and continuous preference which is also non-satiated or single-peaked.
The budget sets depicted in Figure 3 are all convex, and therefore also contractible (they are homotopically equivalent to a set consisting of a single point). Thus, assuming that budget sets are contractible, "have no holes", or even that budgets are convex is not sufficient to guarantee non-satiation or single-peakedness.
Another interesting result is that while both non-satiation and single-peakedness can be falsified-there exist budgets and choices such that no rationalising non-satiated or single-peaked extension exists, as in Figure 3 -, non-satiation cannot be falsified. In particular, whenever there exists a non-satiated rationalising extension, there also exists a single-peaked rationalising extension. Define the following set of rationalising extensions:
Proof By Theorem 4, Ω satisfies Garp. Suppose first that there exists an
for all x ≠ x i . Then, as in the proof of Theorem 4, let P(x) be the set constructed in Lemma 1. Let
Then the proposition can be proven in analogy to Theorem 4. Suppose that there does not exist an
and we can apply the same proof as above.
As mentioned in Section 2.4, the definition of ≻ * in Eq. (12) is problematic if the interior of a budget contains a point of satiation: If
and therefore Garp is violated. To account for this possibility, we introduce the following axiom.
Axiom 2 A set of observations Ω with associated revealed preference relations (≿
* , ≻ * ) satisfies the Single- Peaked-Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference (Sp-Garp) if (x i , x j ) ∈ C T (≿ * ) and Ψ[C T (≿ * ), x i ] ∩ intB j ≠ ∅ implies x i = x j = ϕ
for one and only one ϕ ∈ X.
What we would like to establish now is that Sp-Garp is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a rationalising relation which is single-peaked at some x i ∈ Ω 1 , that is, that the following set is non-empty: Proof Whenever there does not exist a pair (x i , x j ) ∈ C T (≿ * ) and (x j , x i ) ∈ ≻ * (i.e., whenever Garp is satisfied), it follows from Theorem 4 and Proposition 2 that the statement is true. To show necessity of Sp-Garp, suppose Sp-Garp is violated with (
To show sufficiency of Sp-Garp, suppose Sp-Garp is satisfied and (
we can apply almost the same proof as for Theorem 4, using Lemma 1 with S i = X/{x i }.
Further Extension Results: Convexity and Monotonicity
We will now impose the assumption that preferences are convex and/or monotonic by applying the appropriate closure operator to the revealed preference relation. To prepare for the rationalisation theorems below, we first need the following algorithm. For a finite set S = {s i } I i=1 and a binary relation Q ⊆ S × S, an element s i ∈ S is a maximal element with
Algorithm 1 (Varian 1982 )
. , I} and a reflexive binary relation Q ⊆ S × S. Output An index m ∈ I which is the index of a maximal element of S with respect to Q.
1. Set m = 1 and ρ 0 = s 1 .
For each i
Let MaxE(S, Q) be the element returned by Algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 2 Input A set S = {s
2. If I = I * 1 , set I * = 1 and quit. Otherwise, set c = 1 and go to 3. According to the dm's revealed preference relation, he is indifferent between every x i with i ∈ M * k , and his choices do not reveal that he prefers any x j with j ∈ M * ℓ over any x i with i ∈ M * k whenever k < ℓ. We would now like to find a condition on the revealed preference relation which is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a rationalising extension of the revealed preference relation which is complete and continuous and which is also (i) convex, (ii) convex and single-peaked at a certain point ϕ ∈ X, (iii) monotonic, and (iv) both convex and monotonic.
Set I
′ = I/ ⋃ c k=1 I * k . Set R =C(R ∪ {{(s i , s j )} i∈I * c } j∈I ′ ). Set m = MaxE({x i } i∈I ′ , R). Set I * c+1 = {i ∈ I ′ ∶ (s i , s m ) ∈ R}.
Convexity
We start with convexity. Let
be the set of all rationalising binary relations which are convex.
Axiom 3 A set of observations Ω with associated revealed preference relations (≿
Theorem 5 R C ≠ ∅ if and only if Ω satisfies C-Garp.
Proof To show necessity of C-Garp, suppose C-Garp is violated with
To show sufficiency of C-Garp, suppose C-Garp is satisfied. We then proceed with the following steps.
Step 1 Let M * be the partition of M found by calling Algorithm 2 with the set S = Ω 1 indexed by I = M ,
m for some m and j ∈ M * >m , and whenever (
We omit the full proof for the case in which M * 1 contains more than one element; but in that case, a ϕ can be found either in the non-empty interior of the convex hull of all {x i } i∈M * 1 or in an ε-neighbourhood of some x i .
By definition, for all
consists of only element which is not a convex combination of elements in {x
Step 2 We will now show that at every step of Algorithm 2, the updated relation R satisfies C-Garp in the
We will show that this is the case if and only if Ω satisfies C-Garp.
It is obvious that R cannot satisfy C-Garp if Ω violates C-Garp. We will show sufficiency; so suppose Ω satisfies C-Garp. Let R 1 = C C (≿ * ) and let R m , m ≥ 2, be the relation R after the third step of the algorithm has been executed for the (m − 1)th time.
Step 3 We will now construct a sequence of compact convex sets Θ 1 ⊂ Θ 2 ⊂ . . . Θ M * which are used to define preferred and worse sets. As ϕ ∈ Ω 1 , let Θ 1 = {ϕ}. Let HC(x, ε) be the L-dimensional hypercube with centre x and volume ε
Then define for j ∈ {1, . . . , M * − 1} and λ ∈ [0, 1]
All Θ j and Π j (λ) are convex polytopes with finitely many vertices, and Figure 4 for an example. The sets Θ m are our candidates for U(Q, x i ) for some Q ∈ R C and all i ∈ M (i) In a slight abuse of previous definitions, we have
≤m . In both cases, there is at least one x j with j ∈ M * m with i ≠ j such that x j is not a convex combinations of elements with indices in M * ≤m . Thus, (x j , x k ) ∈ R with k ∈ M * <m , where R is the relation computed in Algorithm 2. But that contradicts j ∈ M * m .
(ii) By construction
But then for any ε > 0,
(iii) Similar to (i):
). But then R violates C-Garp, which contradicts the finding in Step 2.
Step 4 For j = 1, . . . , M * , let
Then let
Because all Π j (λ) are closed convex sets, ≿ + ∈ ≿ C and, by construction, C C (≿ * ) ⊂ ≿ + , and (x, ϕ) ∈ ≿ + implies x = ϕ. It remains to be shown that A(≿ + ) ⊃ ≻ * and we have
which contradicts the findings in Step 3.
We can use the result to account for the possibility that the point of satiation of a single-peaked preference is in the interior of a budget set. Let
Axiom 4 A set of observations Ω with associated revealed preference relations (≿ * , ≻ * ) satisfies the
for one and only one ϕ ∈ X.
Then from Theorem 5, we obtain the following interesting corollary.
Corollary 1 R C,S(ϕ) ≠ ∅ if and only if Ω satisfies C-Sp-Garp.
Proof Necessity of C-Sp-Garp can be shown in analogy to necessity of C-Garp in the proof of Theorem 5.
. Then if C-Sp-Garp is satisfied, then a violation of C-Garp can only occur of x i ∈ intB i , and for all
Then the point of satiation is ϕ = x i . In the 22 proof of Theorem 5, we have actually constructed a Q ∈ R C,S(ϕ) ; it can be easily extended to show that if C-Sp-Garp is satisfied but C-Garp is violated, the construction still works.
Monotonicity
Axiom 5 A set of observations Ω with associated revealed preference relations (≿ * , ≻ * ) satisfies the
Theorem 6 R M ≠ ∅ if and only if Ω satisfies M-Garp.
We omit the proof here, as it is similar to the proof of Theorem 5. Sufficiency of M-Garp is again quite obvious. Sufficiency of M-Garp can be shown in analogy to the proof of Theorem 5 based on a slightly modified version of Alogrithm 2 and replacing convex hulls with monotonic hulls.
Convexity and Monotonicity
We can combine convexity and monotonicity to obtain a rationalisation result which corresponds to Afriat's Theorem. Let
Axiom 6 A set of observations Ω with associated revealed preference relations (≿ * , ≻ * ) satisfies the Convexity-
Theorem 7 R C,M ≠ ∅ if and only if Ω satisfies C-M-Garp.
We omit the full proof here. Necessary of C-M-Garp can be shown in analogy to the previous proofs. Sufficiency of C-M-Garp can be shown with a variant of the proofs of Theorems 5 and 6, by replacing convex and monotonic hulls with convex monotonic hulls.
Restrictions on Budgets: Competitive Consumers
In consumer theory with competitive budgets from the B D family, Afriat's Theorem shows that Garp is not only equivalent to the existence of a rationalising non-satiated utility function, but also the existence of a rationalising monotonic and concave utility function.
Theorem 8 (Afriat 1967 , Diewert 1973 , Varian 1982 With the results we have obtained so far we obtain the following corollary, which shows that Garp and C-M-Garp are equivalent when all budgets are competitive. It also shows that Garp implies the existence of a rationalising single-peaked extension. As Varian (1982) has shown, revealed preference relations can be used to recover a large part of a consumer's preference when he is observed to choose from competitive budget sets and satisfies Garp. This nonparametric approach allows to recover large parts of a preference without relying on specific functional forms of utility. Varian defines the "revealed preferred set" in terms of Garp. The set of price vectors which support a consumption bundle x is the set of all prices at which x can be demanded without violating Garp, given all the observed choices. The the revealed preferred set of some y ∈ X is the set of all bundles which, when demanded at any supporting price vector, will be (strictly) revealed preferred to y. T Varian (1982) showed that the interior of the convex monotonic hull of all choices revealed preferred to x is a subset of the revealed preferred set of x. Knoblauch (1992) has shown that the revealed preferred set of x is a subset of the closure of the convex monotonic hull of all choices revealed preferred to x. The definition of the revealed preferred set in terms of Garp and in the context of competitive budget sets implicitly assumes that preferences are both convex and monotonic. Garp guarantees that this hypothesis cannot be rejected, as Afriat's Theorem shows. We would like to make this assumption more explicit in the following proposition, which is based on the intersection of all rationalising extensions of the revealed preference relation which satisfy additional assumptions.
Corollary 2 Suppose
Suppose Ω satisfies C-Garp; then we know that there exists a Q ∈ R C . We would like to know, for some arbitrary element x ∈ X, the set of all elements in X such that every Q ∈ R C ranks this element higher than x; similarly, we would like to know the set of all elements which a ranked lower than x by every Q ∈ R C . Preferably, these sets should be described in a way that makes their construction operational. Proposition 4 provides such a way. Similarly to Varian (1982) and Knoblauch (1992) , we show that these sets are characterised by the convex hull of a subset of the observed choices Ω 1 . The proposition furthermore distinguishes between convex and monotonic extensions. The set of all y ∈ X which, for every convex extension of CC (≿ * ), must be preferred to x, and the set of all y ∈ X which must be worse than x.
When choices are observed on competitive budget sets, it is very easy to compute the revealed preference relation, as budgets are merely hyperplanes implicitly defined by the price vector. The general setup, where budgets are compact subsets of X with non-empty relative interiors, complicates this computation. When budgets can be described by a continuous function д ∶ X → R, such that B = {x ∈ X ∶ д(x) ≥ 0}, such as the budgets considered by Forges and Minelli (2009) , it is quite straightforward to compute ≿ * and its closures.
Experiments based on the framework in this paper are naturally limited to budgets which can be presented to subjects in an understandable way. The graphical approach introduced by Choi et al. (2007a) and Fisman et al. (2007) , which allows subjects to click on their desired element with a computer mouse, certainly allows more general budget sets than competitive ones. Simple non-monotonic budget sets, such as those considered in Andreoni and Miller (2002) to test preferences for inequality aversion, can be easily described both in mathematical terms and graphically. Thus, budgets do not need to be overly complicated to generate useful extra information which cannot be collected using competitive budget sets. What design of budget is useful depends on the context of the study, but the analysis in this paper covers almost every conceivable possibility. 5 other closure operators
Mean-Variance and Stochastic Dominance
We first consider a portfolio choice framework, which is based on Heufer (2011) .
There are L different states which can obtain after the portfolio choice has been made. In each state i ∈ {1, . . . , L}, asset i is the only asset that pays off. State i occurs with probability π i ∈ Δ, where Δ is the (L − 1) probability simplex, i.e., π i ≥ 0 for all i and ∑ L i=1 π i = 1. The probability vector π is known to the dm. Letπ(x) denote the ex post realised payoff of a portfolio x.
Note that the asset space X and the space of state contingent payoffs are the same. A portfolio x = (x 1 , . . . , x L ) ∈ X specifies the amounts invested in L different assets, where an asset is a state-contingent claim. We can define an asset as a column vector X ⋅,i = (X 1,i , . . . , X L,i ) ′ which specifies the payoff in the different states 1, . . . , L, and x i is the amount of money invested in this asset. In the present framework, asset i is simply given by X i,i = 1 and X j,i = 0 for j ≠ i, and X is the identity matrix. These basic assets are also known as Arrow-Debreu securities. The payoff in state j of a portfolio x is then (X j,⋅ )x = x j . Instead of defining the dm's preferences over payoffs in the different states, we can equivalently define the preferences over portfolios. This setup is more general than it may appear: Suppose that instead of Arrow-Debreu securities, there are K ≥ 2 linearly independent general assets Y ⋅,i . Asset Y ⋅,i pays off Y j,i ≥ 0 in state j. If we allow short-selling of these assets, that is, to invest in a negative amount of some of the general assets, we need a no arbitrage (no free lunch) condition. If this condition holds, and if there are at least K = L linearly independent general assets, then the problem of choosing a portfolio of general assets is isomorphic to a problem of choosing a portfolio of Arrow-Debreu securities. Then if instead of choices over basic Arrow-Debreu securities we observe choices over more general assets, we can transform the observations into an equivalent set of observations over (fictional) Arrow-Debreu securities. This follows from the work of Ross (1978) , Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) , and Varian (1987) , among others.
Let E(x) = ∑ π i x i be the expected value of a portfolio x ∈ X. Let ≿ E ∈ Q be defined as For mean-variance preferences, we assume that a dm prefers portfolio x over portfolio y whenever x has a higher expected value and a lower variance, that is ≿ ⊃ (≿ E ∩ ≿ Var ). If a dm maximises a monotonically increasing utility function defined on X, it can be easily shown that ≿ ⊃ ≿ Fsd , and for a risk averse expected utility maximiser, ≿ ⊃ ≿ Ssd . Note that (≿ E ∩ ≿ Var ) ⊂≿ Ssd and ≿ Fsd ⊂ ≿ Ssd , but (≿ E ∩ ≿ Var ) / ⊆ ≿ Fsd and ≿ Fsd / ⊆ (≿ E ∩ ≿ Var ). We can then define new closure operators:
and test these extended relations for some consistency axiom. See Heufer (2011) for a detailed analysis of stochastic dominance extensions.
Further Possible Closure Operators
Many other closure operators are possible. A very common assumption is that preferences are homothetic, and it is quite straightforward to impose this assumption on revealed preferences (see, for example, Knoblauch 1993 ). Social preferences, preferences for altruism, or individual ideas about (distributive) justice have been analysed, among many others, by Safra (2002a,b, 2008) and Cox et al. (2008) ; experimental approaches include Andreoni and Miller (2002) , Fisman et al. (2007) , and . Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman et al. (2007) in particular use induced competitive budgets to examine subjects' preferences for giving money to other subjects in a generalised dictator game. Andreoni and Miller (2002) also included some non-monotonic budget sets to test preferences for monotonicity. The collected choices can then be used to derive the revealed preference relation over a subject's own payoff and the payoff of others. A possible extension could be based on the assumption that a subject at least weakly prefers (x 1 , x 2 ) over (x 2 , x 1 ) if x 1 < x 2 , where x 1 is the own payoff and x 2 is the payoff to a different subject.
A further extension can be based on multiple-peaks of a preference as a generalisation of singlepeakedness. Figure 3 shows an example of choices for which no single-peaked rationalising extension exists, but the choices can be rationalised by two-peaked preferences.
conclusion
This paper provides a way to deal with choices from very general budget sets and shows how the revealed preference relation based on these choices can be extended using different closure operators which impose additional assumptions on the preferences of a decision maker. The paper derives several axioms which are possible to test and which provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of continuous complete extensions which satisfy several assumptions and rationalise the observed choices. The results are used for a nonparametric analysis of revealed preference data.
The paper is the first step towards an extensive analysis of what we can learn from observables about a decision maker's preferences under very general circumstances. Future work will focus on further applications of the methods presented here. One possible application is to reconsider the "falsifiable closure" introduced in Chambers et al. (2010) and to examine them under the assumption that we observe choices on varies families of budgets.
Another major step will be to use the methods to analyse a model where a decision maker's preference weakly depends on two relations, one of which is known a priori; the other relation is called the residual relation. The revealed preference relation and the a priori relation are then used to draw conclusions about the residual relation, based on the simple axiom that the intersection of the a priori and the residual relation is a subset of the preference. One example are risk preferences, where the expected value of lotteries is known a priori, and the residual relation is the dm's individual notion of riskiness. The residual relation captures the part of the dm's preference which can be used for interpersonal comparison of two different dms.
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